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Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution (DDI-QKD) held the promise of being robust to
detector side channels, a major security loophole in quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations. In
contrast to what has been claimed, however, we demonstrate that the security of DDI-QKD is not based on
postselected entanglement, and we introduce various eavesdropping strategies that show that DDI-QKD is
in fact insecure against detector side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit devices’
imperfections of the receiver. Our attacks are valid even when the QKD apparatuses are built by the
legitimate users of the system themselves, and thus, free of malicious modifications, which is a key
assumption in DDI-QKD.
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Introduction.—Quantum key distribution (QKD), a tech-
nique to distribute a secret random bit string between two
separated parties (Alice and Bob), needs to close the gap
between theory and practice [1]. In theory, QKD provides
information-theoretic security. In practice, however, it does
not because QKD implementation devices do not typically
conform to the theoretical models considered in the security
proofs. As a result, any unaccounted device imperfection
might constitute a side channel, which could be used by an
eavesdropper (Eve) to learn the secret key without being
detected [2–12].
To bridge this gap, various approaches have been
proposed recently [13–17], with measurement-device-
independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [17] probably being the
most promising one in terms of feasibility and performance.
Its security is based on postselected entanglement, and it
can remove all detector side channels from QKD imple-
mentations, which is arguably their major security loophole
[3–10,12]. Also, its practicality has been already confirmed
both in laboratories and via field trials [18–24]. A drawback
of MDI-QKD is, however, that it requires high-visibility
two-photon interference between independent sources,
which makes its implementation more demanding than
that of conventional QKD schemes. In addition, current
finite-key security bounds against general attacks [25]
require larger postprocessing data block sizes than those
of standard QKD, though recent proposals [26] signifi-
cantly improve the performance of MDI-QKD in the finite-
key regime.
To overcome these limitations, a novel approach, so-
called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD), has
been introduced recently [27–30]. It avoids the problem of
interfering photons from independent light sources by
using the concept of a single-photon Bell state measure-
ment (BSM) [31]. As a result, its finite-key security bounds
and classical postprocessing data block sizes are expected
to be similar to those of prepare-and-measure QKD
schemes [32]. Despite this presumed promising perfor-
mance, however, the robustness of DDI-QKD against
detector side-channel attacks has not been rigorously
proven yet, and only partial security proofs have been
introduced [27,28].
In this Letter, we show that in contrast to what has
been claimed [27–30], the security of DDI-QKD cannot
rely on the same principles as MDI-QKD, i.e., postselected
entanglement. More importantly, we demonstrate that DDI-
QKD is in fact vulnerable to detector side-channel attacks
and to other attacks that exploit imperfections of
the receiver’s devices. These attacks are valid even when
Alice’s and Bob’s state preparation processes are fully
characterized and trusted, an essential assumption in DDI-
QKD. Moreover, they do not require that Eve substitutes
Bob’s detectors with a measurement apparatus prepared by
herself to leak key information to the channel [33]. That is,
our attacks apply as well to the scenario where Alice and
Bob build the QKD devices themselves.
MDI-QKD & DDI-QKD.—Let us start by reviewing the
basic principles behind MDI-QKD and DDI-QKD. To
simplify the discussion, we shall assume that Alice and
Bob have at their disposal perfect single-photon sources.
Note, however, that both schemes can operate as well, for
instance, with phase-randomized weak coherent pulses in
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combination with decoy states [34–36], which do not
prevent the attacks considered here.
An example of a possible implementation of MDI-QKD
is illustrated in Fig. 1(a) [17]. Both Alice and Bob generate
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) states [37] and send them to
an untrusted relay, Charles. If Charles is honest, he
performs a two-photon BSM that projects the incoming
signals into a Bell state. In any case, Charles has to declare
which of his measurements are successful together with the
Bell states obtained. Alice and Bob then extract a secret key
from those successful events where they used the same
basis. Importantly, if Charles is honest, his BSM meas-
urement postselects entanglement between Alice and Bob,
and therefore, he is not able to learn any information about
their bit values. To test whether or not Charles is honest,
Alice and Bob can simply compare a randomly chosen
subset of their data to see if it satisfies the expected
correlations associated to the Bell states announced. That
is, MDI-QKD can be seen as a time-reversed Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen QKD protocol [38]. Therefore, its security
can be proven without any assumption on the behavior of
Charles’ measurement unit.
DDI-QKD [27–30] aims to follow the same spirit of
MDI-QKD. The key idea is to replace the two-photon
BSM with a 2-qubit single-photon BSM [31]. This requires
that Alice and Bob use two different degrees of freedom of
the single photons to encode their bit information. In so
doing, one avoids the need for interfering photons from
independent light sources. An example of a possible
implementation is illustrated in Fig. 1(b) [28] (see also
[27,29,30] for similar proposals). Here, Alice sends Bob
BB84 polarization states: ðjHi þ eiθA jViÞ= ﬃﬃﬃ2p , where jHi
(jVi) denotes the Fock state of a single photon prepared in
horizontal (vertical) polarization, and the phase
θA ∈ f0; π=2; π; 3π=2g. Bob then encodes his bit informa-
tion by using the spatial degree of freedom of the incoming
photons. This is done with a 50∶50 beam splitter (BS)
together with a phase modulator (PM) that applies a
random phase φB ∈ f0; π=2; π; 3π=2g to each input signal.
Finally, Bob performs a BSM that projects each input
photon into a Bell state: jΦi ¼ ðjHijui  jVijliÞ= ﬃﬃﬃ2p and
jΨi ¼ ðjHijli  jVijuiÞ= ﬃﬃﬃ2p , where jui (jli) represents
the state of a photon that goes through the upper (lower)
arm of the interferometer [see Fig. 1(b)]. A photon
detection event (click) in only one detector Di corresponds
to a projection on a particular Bell state.
Both MDI-QKD and DDI-QKD require that Alice’s and
Bob’s state preparation processes are characterized and
trusted. This is indicated by the gray areas shown in Fig. 1.
In DDI-QKD, the elements inside Bob’s gray area can be
regarded as his trusted transmitter (when compared to
MDI-QKD). Among the trusted components there are
elements, which belong to the BSM, but, importantly,
the detectors Di do not need to be trusted.
The security of DDI-QKD is not based on postselected
entanglement.—At first sight, it seems that the security of
DDI-QKD follows directly from that of MDI-QKD, given,
of course, that the assumptions on Alice’s and Bob’s state
preparation processes are fulfilled [27–30]. That is, it relies
on the fact that the BSM postselects entanglement between
Alice and Bob. A first indication that confronts this idea
was given recently in [33]. There, it was shown that in
contrast to MDI-QKD, DDI-QKD is actually insecure if
Eve is able to replace Bob’s detectors with a measurement
apparatus that leaks information to the channel [33].
Although this result is important from a conceptual point
of view, it violates one of the security assumptions of DDI-
QKD: Bob’s detectors have to be built by a trusted party
(but do not need to be characterized) to avoid that
they intentionally leak key information to the outside
[27]. Below, we show that even in this scenario, the
security of DDI-QKD cannot be based on postselected
entanglement alone, unlike MDI-QKD.
For this, we will consider a slightly simplified version of
the DDI-QKD scheme illustrated in Fig. 1(b). In particular,
we will assume that Bob’s receiver has only one active
detector, say for instance, the detector D1, while the other
detectors are disabled. That is, now Bob’s BSM projects
the incoming photons only into the Bell state jΨþi. If the
security of DDI-QKD is based on postselected entangle-
ment, this modification should not affect its security (only
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FIG. 1. Possible implementations of partially device-indepen-
dent QKD with linear optics. (a) MDI-QKD [17], PBS, polarizing
beam splitter; BS, 50∶50 beam splitter; and Di, with
i ∈ f1; 2; 3; 4g, Charles’ single-photon detectors. (b) DDI-
QKD [28], HWP, half-wave plate, and PM, phase modulator.
One single click in the detector D1, D2, D3, or D4 corresponds to
a projection into the Bell state jΨþi, jΦþi, jΨ−i, or jΦ−i,
respectively (see main text for further details). In both schemes,
the gray areas denote devices that need to be characterized and
trusted. Also, Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories need to be protected
from any information leakage to the outside.
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its secret key rate is reduced by a factor of four), as a
projection into a single Bell state should be sufficient to
guarantee security [17]. Next, we show that a blinding
attack [6,8] renders DDI-QKD insecure in this situation.
In particular, suppose that Eve shines bright light onto
Bob’s detector D1 to make it enter linear-mode operation
[6,8]. In this mode, the detector is no longer sensitive to
single-photon pulses, but it can only detect strong light.
We assume that when D1 receives a bright pulse of mean
photon number μ, it always produces a click, while if the
pulse’s mean photon number is μ=2, it never produces a
click. This behavior has been experimentally confirmed in
many detector types [6,8,39–44]. Once D1 is blinded, Eve
performs an intercept-resend attack on every signal sent by
Alice. That is, she measures Alice’s signals in one of the
two BB84 bases (which Eve selects at random for each
pulse), and she prepares a new signal, depending on the
result obtained, that is sent to Bob. Intercept-resend attacks
correspond to entanglement-breaking channels and, there-
fore, they cannot lead to a secure key [45]. Suppose,
for instance, that the signals that Eve sends to Bob are
coherent states of the form j ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2μp i, with creation operator
a† ¼ ða†H þ eiϕEa†VÞ=
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
. Here, a†H (a
†
V) denotes the cre-
ation operator for horizontally (vertically) polarized pho-
tons, and the phase ϕE ∈ f0; π=2; π; 3π=2g depends on
Eve’s measurement result. More precisely, for each mea-
sured signal, Eve sends Bob a coherent state prepared in the
BB84 polarization state identified by her measurement.
Then, it can be shown that the state at the input ports of
Bob’s detectors Di is a coherent state of the form (see
Supplemental Material Sec. I [46] for details)
jψi ¼

ﬃﬃﬃ
μ
p
2
ðeiϕE þ eiφBÞ

D1
⊗

ﬃﬃﬃ
μ
p
2
ð1þ eiðϕEþφBÞÞ

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
ﬃﬃﬃ
μ
p
2
ðeiϕE − eiφBÞ

D3
⊗

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μ
p
2
ð1 − eiðϕEþφBÞÞ

D4
:
ð1Þ
This situation is illustrated in Table I, where we show
the mean photon number of the incoming light to Bob’s
detectors for all combinations of ϕE and φB. Most
importantly, from this table we can see that if D1 is the
only active detector, then Bob only obtains a click when he
uses the same measurement basis as Eve, i.e., when φB,
ϕE ∈ f0; πg or φB, ϕE ∈ fπ=2; 3π=2g), and φB ¼ ϕE. That
is, this attack does not introduce any error. Moreover, we
have that Bob and Eve select the same basis with at least
1=2 probability. This means that the DDI-QKD scheme
illustrated in Fig. 1(b) (with only one active detector) is
actually insecure against the detector blinding attack for a
total system loss beyond only 3 dB, just like standard QKD
schemes. This confirms that the security of DDI-QKD
cannot be based on postselected entanglement. The same
conclusion applies as well to the DDI-QKD schemes
introduced in Refs. [27,29], and [30].
Insecurity of DDI-QKD against detector side-channel
attacks.—If Bob uses four active detectors, the detector
blinding attack has one main drawback: it produces
double clicks [33]. From Table I, one can already see that
whenever Bob uses the same measurement basis as Eve,
there are always two detectors that click. For instance,
when φB ¼ ϕE ¼ 0, the detectors D1 and D2 always click,
similar for the other cases. This means that Alice and Bob
could, in principle, try to monitor double clicks to detect the
presence of Eve. So, the question is whether or not four
active detectors can make DDI-QKD secure again. As we
show below, the answer is no. For this, we introduce two
possible eavesdropping strategies that exploit practical
imperfections of Bob’s detectors to avoid double clicks.
See also Supplemental Material Sec. II [46] for two
alternative attacks that achieve the same goal by exploiting
other imperfections of Bob’s linear optics network.
The first eavesdropping strategy uses the fact that single-
photon detectors respond differently to the same blinding
power PB. This has been recently analyzed in Ref. [44].
TABLE I. Mean photon number of the input light to Bob’s
detectors as a function of the phases ϕE and φB.
(a) ϕE ¼ 0
φB D1 D2 D3 D4
0 μ μ 0 0
π=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2
π 0 0 μ μ
3π=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2
(b) ϕE ¼ π=2
φB D1 D2 D3 D4
0 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2
π=2 μ 0 0 μ
π μ=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2
3π=2 0 μ μ 0
(c) ϕE ¼ π
φB D1 D2 D3 D4
0 0 0 μ μ
π=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2
π μ μ 0 0
3π=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2
(d) ϕE ¼ 3π=2
φB D1 D2 D3 D4
0 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2
π=2 0 μ μ 0
π μ=2 μ=2 μ=2 μ=2
3π=2 μ 0 0 μ
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There, the authors compare the response of two single-
photon detectors in a commercial QKD system Clavis2 [49]
to varying blinding power. They first illuminate the
detectors with continuous-wave bright light of power PB
to force them enter linear-mode operation. Then they record
the maximum and minimum value of the trigger pulse
energy ET for which the click probabilities are 0 and 1,
respectively. The results are shown in Fig. 2(a) [44]. For a
particular blinding power PB, each point in the solid
(dashed) curves shown in the figure represents the maxi-
mum (minimum) value of trigger pulse energy ET for
which the detection efficiency ηdet is 0 (1). The blue and
green colors identify the two detectors. (Note that if the
energies ET corresponding to the dashed curves are halved,
the result is always below the solid curves, thus satisfying
the assumption made in the previous section that pulses
with mean photon number μ=2 result in zero-click
probability.) Next, we show how these detector character-
istics could be used to avoid double clicks.
For this, we return to the blinding attack described
above against the DDI-QKD implementation illustrated in
Fig. 1(b). For simplicity, let us consider again the case
where φB ¼ ϕE ¼ 0. In particular, suppose for instance that
Eve wants to force a click only on detectorD1, and no click
on detector D2. Then, in order to achieve this goal, she can
simply choose a combination of PB and ET , such that the
detector D1 (D2) has a nonzero (zero) click probability.
If the behavior of the detector D1 (D2) corresponds to the
green (blue) curves shown in Fig. 2(a), then the values
PB ≈ 0.2 mW and ET ≈ 0.1 pJ constitute an example that
satisfies this criterion. Similarly, if PB ≈ 0.56 mW and
ET ≈ 0.19 pJ, then Eve could make the detector D2 (D1) to
have a nonzero click probability. Importantly, note that
when Bob’s basis matches that of Eve, only two out of the
four detectors Di might produce a click (see Table I).
Hence, in these instances, Eve only needs to avoid double
clicks between two detectors in order to remain undetected.
A similar argument can be applied as well to any other
value of φB and ϕE.
This attack demonstrates that if Bob’s detectors are
uncharacterized, as assumed in DDI-QKD, these type of
schemes are indeed insecure against detector side-channel
attacks. That is, Eve could learn the whole secret key
without producing any error nor a double click.
A second eavesdropping strategy that also allows Eve
to avoid double clicks is based on a time-shift attack [3,4]
that exploits the detection efficiency mismatch between
Bob’s detectors. In this type of attack, Eve shifts the arrival
time of each signal that she sends to Bob such that only one
detector can produce a click each given time. Here, we have
confirmed experimentally that this type of attack is also
possible with blinded detectors. For this, we blinded two
single-photon detectors from the commercial QKD system
Clavis2 [49], and we measured their detection efficiency
mismatch. The experimental results are shown in Fig. 2(b).
We find, for instance, that whenever Bob receives a trigger
pulse at the time instance T1 (T2), only the detectorD1 (D2)
can produce a click because this instance is outside of the
response region of the detector D2 (D1). That is, by
combining the time-shift attack with the blinding attack
introduced in the previous section, Eve could again break
the security of DDI-QKD without introducing errors nor
double clicks.
Conclusion.—We have analyzed the security of detector-
device-independent QKD, a novel scheme that promised
to be robust against detector side-channel attacks. We have
shown that its security is not based on postselected
entanglement, as originally claimed. Most importantly,
we have presented various eavesdropping attacks that
demonstrate that DDI-QKD is actually vulnerable to
detector side-channel attacks as well as to other side-
channel attacks that exploit imperfections of Bob’s receiver.
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FIG. 2. Detector click probability in bright light blinded regime
in commercial QKD system Clavis2. (a) Click trigger thresholds
vs blinding power PB for two different single-photon detectors
D1 andD2. Here, for a particular blinding power PB, each point in
the solid (dashed) curves represents the maximum (minimum)
value of trigger pulse energy ET for which the detection
efficiency ηdet is 0 (1). The experimental data have been reprinted
from Ref. [44]. (b) Measured detection efficiency mismatch in the
time domain between two blinded single-photon detectors at
PB ¼ 0.32 mW, ET ¼ 0.24 pJ, and 0.7 ns wide trigger pulse (see
main text for further details).
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These attacks are valid even when Alice’s and Bob’s state
preparation processes are fully characterized and trusted,
and Bob’s detectors are built by a trusted party and cannot
be replaced with a measurement device manufactured by
Eve. Alice and Bob might try to prevent these attacks by
designing proper countermeasures at the detector side, just
like in standard QKD schemes. In such scenarios, however,
it is unclear what would be the real advantage (in terms of
complexity and performance) of using DDI-QKD instead
of standard QKD systems. As a final remark, let us say that
the main reason for the insecurity of DDI-QKD seems to be
Bob’s state preparation process; while in MDI-QKD, it is
assumed to be protected, in DDI-QKD it can be influenced
by Eve via the signals she sends him.
This work was supported by Industry Canada, CFI,
NSERC (programs Discovery, PDF, CryptoWorks21),
Ontario MRI, US Office of Naval Research, National
Natural Science Foundation of China (Grants
No. 11304391 and 11674397), Spain MINECO, Fondo
Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, FEDER (Grant
No. TEC2014-54898-R), and Galician Regional
Government (Programs EM2014/033, AtlantTIC). The
authors thank ID Quantique for cooperation, technical
assistance, and providing the QKD hardware.
S. S. and A. H. contributed equally to this work.
*shihan.sajeed@gmail.com
[1] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and K. Tamaki, Nat. Photonics 8, 595
(2014).
[2] A. Vakhitov, V. Makarov, and D. R. Hjelme, J. Mod. Opt.
48, 2023 (2001).
[3] V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, Phys. Rev. A 74,
022313 (2006); 78, 019905(E) (2008).
[4] B. Qi, C.-H. F. Fung, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma, Quantum Inf.
Comput. 7, 73 (2007).
[5] A. Lamas-Linares and C. Kurtsiefer, Opt. Express 15, 9388
(2007).
[6] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar,
and V. Makarov, Nat. Photonics 4, 686 (2010).
[7] F. Xu, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, New J. Phys. 12, 113026
(2010).
[8] I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C.
Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov, Nat. Commun. 2, 349 (2011).
[9] H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H.
Weinfurter, New J. Phys. 13, 073024 (2011).
[10] P. Jouguet, S. Kunz-Jacques, and E. Diamanti, Phys. Rev. A
87, 062313 (2013).
[11] S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa,
L. Monat, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, Phys. Rev. A 91,
032326 (2015).
[12] S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein,
N. Lütkenhaus, and V. Makarov, Phys. Rev. A 91, 062301
(2015).
[13] D. Mayers and A. Yao, Proc. 39th Annual Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science (IEEE, Palo Alto,
California, 1998), pp. 503–509.
[14] A. Acín, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar, S. Pironio, and V.
Scarani, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501 (2007).
[15] U. Vazirani and T. Vidick, Phys. Rev. Lett. 113, 140501
(2014).
[16] C. A. Miller and Y. Shi, Proc. 46th Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing (STOC’14) (ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 2014), pp. 417–426.
[17] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 130503
(2012).
[18] A. Rubenok, J. A. Slater, P. Chan, I. Lucio-Martinez, and W.
Tittel, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 130501 (2013).
[19] T. Ferreira da Silva, D. Vitoreti, G. B. Xavier, G. C. do
Amaral, G. P. Temporão, and J. P. von der Weid, Phys. Rev.
A 88, 052303 (2013).
[20] Y. Liu et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 130502 (2013).
[21] Z. Tang, Z. Liao, F. Xu, B. Qi, L. Qian, and H.-K. Lo, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 112, 190503 (2014).
[22] L. C. Comandar, M. Lucamarini, B. Fröhlich, J. F. Dynes,
A.W. Sharpe, S. W.-B. Tam, Z. L. Yuan, R. V. Penty, and
A. J. Shields, Nat. Photonics 10, 312 (2016).
[23] Y.-L. Tang et al., Phys. Rev. X 6, 011024 (2016).
[24] H.-L. Yin et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 117, 190501 (2016).
[25] M. Curty, F. Xu, W. Cui, C. C. W. Lim, K. Tamaki, and
H.-K. Lo, Nat. Commun. 5, 3732 (2014).
[26] Y.-H. Zhou, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. A 93,
042324 (2016).
[27] P. González, L. Rebón, T. Ferreira da Silva, M. Figueroa,
C. Saavedra, M. Curty, G. Lima, G. B. Xavier, and W. A. T.
Nogueira, Phys. Rev. A 92, 022337 (2015).
[28] C. C. W. Lim, B. Korzh, A. Martin, F. Bussières, R. Thew,
and H. Zbinden, Appl. Phys. Lett. 105, 221112 (2014).
[29] W.-F. Cao, Y.-Z. Zhen, Y.-L. Zheng, Z.-B. Chen, N.-L. Liu,
K. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, arXiv:1410.2928v1 (manuscript
withdrawn by authors on 23 Aug 2016 owing to the
insecurity of the proposed scheme).
[30] W.-Y. Liang, M. Li, Z.-Q. Yin, W. Chen, S. Wang, X.-B. An,
G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Phys. Rev. A 92, 012319 (2015).
[31] Y.-H. Kim, Phys. Rev. A 67, 040301 (2003).
[32] C. C. W. Lim, M. Curty, N. Walenta, F. Xu, and H. Zbinden,
Phys. Rev. A 89, 022307 (2014).
[33] B. Qi, Phys. Rev. A 91, 020303 (2015).
[34] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[35] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230504
(2005).
[36] X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[37] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Proc. IEEE International
Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing
(Bangalore, India) (IEEE Press, New York, 1984),
pp. 175–179.
[38] E. Biham, B. Huttner, and T. Mor, Phys. Rev. A 54, 2651
(1996).
[39] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar,
and V. Makarov, Opt. Express 18, 27938 (2010).
[40] C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar,
C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, New J. Phys. 13,
013043 (2011).
[41] L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V.
Makarov, New J. Phys. 13, 113042 (2011).
[42] S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar, and V.
Makarov, Opt. Express 19, 23590 (2011).
PRL 117, 250505 (2016) P HY S I CA L R EV I EW LE T T ER S
week ending
16 DECEMBER 2016
250505-5
[43] J. Jogenfors, A. M. Elhassan, J. Ahrens, M. Bourennane,
and J.-A. Larsson, Sci. Adv. 1, e1500793 (2015).
[44] A. Huang, S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Soucarros, M.
Legré, and V. Makarov, IEEE J. Quantum Electron. 52,
8000211 (2016).
[45] M. Curty, M. Lewenstein, and N. Lütkenhaus, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 92, 217903 (2004).
[46] See Supplemental Material at http://link.aps.org/
supplemental/10.1103/PhysRevLett.117.250505 which
also includes Refs. [28,47,48] for more details about the
quantum states arriving at Bob’s detectors and for side-
channel attacks that exploit imperfections of Bob’s linear
optics network.
[47] F. Xu, K. Wei, S. Sajeed, S. Kaiser, S. Sun, Z. Tang, L.
Qian, V. Makarov, and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 92, 032305
(2015).
[48] H.-W. Li et al., Phys. Rev. A 84, 062308 (2011).
[49] Clavis2 specification sheet, http://www.idquantique
.com/images/stories/PDF/clavis2‑quantum‑key‑distribution/
clavis2‑specs.pdf.
PRL 117, 250505 (2016) P HY S I CA L R EV I EW LE T T ER S
week ending
16 DECEMBER 2016
250505-6
